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

File Ui Salt

25 August 1988

NOTE TO THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Bob:

As usual, this is a fine paper. I have no comments on what is here.

The reader who sees your name on an article concerning the relationship between the CIA and the President might reasonably expect more discussion on what has happened during the past eight years. The history that you discuss is illuminating but your message might be driven home still more effectively with some more recent examples.

Obviously, there are dangers in being too current. One more or less antiseptic issue that you might wish to discuss somewhere in the paper would be intelligence support leading up to the INF Treaty. Such a discussion could make the point that we are critically important and appreciated in some respects; unable to deliver (monitor, etc.) in other key areas; and divided among ourselves in ways that are frustrating to the President (e.g., CIA-DIA split on non-deployed missiles). To repeat, I think a couple of paragraphs on the build up to the INF Treaty would underscore a lot of your points effectively (including the tension between Administration and Congress) and give the paper a more current ring, but still not get you into trouble with anybody.

There is another theme in your paper that is implicit but I think would enlighten a reader if made more explicit. That is, the CIA is a high stakes institution. The President does not have the option of ignoring it as he can ignore many other executive departments and agencies. The CIA can do terrifically useful things and does, (and you might wish to provide an example or two), but it is also an organization that can get the President into terrible trouble quickly, as with the Bay of Pigs or if we had become more centrally involved in the Iran-Contra mess.

In fact, any informed reader will pick up an article like this wondering what you have to say about the impact of Iran-Contra on the relationship between the President and the Agency, or what lessons it holds. I would not recommend getting far into this for obvious reasons except in the limited way I have suggested, i.e., as an illustration of the kinds of things the CIA could be drawn into, (also like Watergate, for example), if the rules are not clear about the kinds of support--substantive and operational--that the Agency legitimately should provide a President.

STAT

John L. Helgerson

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Opportunity Unfulfilled
The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence at the White House

Robert M. Gates

"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at one goal -- producing accurate reliable intelligence.... Who are the customers who get this finished product? At the very top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency's most important customer."

Intelligence: The Acme of Skill
(CIA Information Pamphlet)

And what have our most important customers had to say about how well we achieve that goal?

"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence."

Jimmy Carter, 1978

"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"

Richard Nixon, 1970

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